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Introduction
A new favorite weapon of the anti-abortion rights movement is
legislation that singles out abortion facilities and providers for
unnecessary and burdensome regulations (targeted regulation of
abortion providers or “TRAP” laws). TRAP laws have infamously
led to the closure of dozens of clinics in Texas and would have
shuttered Mississippi’s sole remaining clinic until that law was
enjoined. TRAP laws purport to promote women’s health, but they
†
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feedback on the ideas presented here, the author thanks participants at
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Elisabeth Wise, CUNY School of Law ’16, for her excellent research
assistance.
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are part of a broader strategy to dismantle the right to abortion
incrementally. States are constitutionally prohibited from enacting
laws with the intent to hinder access to abortion. The question
remains how to prove to courts that TRAP laws have this purpose or
are otherwise unconstitutional.
Dormant commerce clause analysis may provide a useful
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of TRAP laws that
discriminate against abortion clinics without a valid medical reason.
Generally speaking, dormant commerce clause case law is an
appropriate source of comparison because it addresses a similar
phenomenon to TRAP laws, namely a state’s desire to pursue a
politically motivated - and often politically popular - but
impermissible goal. In the dormant commerce clause context, this
goal is to protect local economic interests against interstate
competition. Because the goal is constitutionally prohibited, however,
states attempt to justify these laws on other grounds, such as
environmental protection.
Specifically, dormant commerce clause jurisprudence provides two
potential answers to the question of how to prove TRAP laws’
unconstitutionality. Dormant commerce clause case law first analyzes
whether the law discriminates against interstate commerce.1 One
aspect of this analysis is an independent purpose inquiry that provides
a model for courts seeking to identify whether a TRAP law was
motivated by the impermissible purpose of impeding access to
abortion. When laws do discriminate against interstate commerce,
dormant commerce clause case law requires states to justify the law
on grounds other than economic protectionism. Assuming the state
declares a valid alternative purpose, the court then examines whether
the state could have pursued that purpose through less discriminatory
means. This requirement that the state justify its law with a valid
reason and the least-discriminatory-means analysis are also well-suited
for analyzing the credibility of the woman-centered, medical safety
rationale states offer for TRAP laws.
Dormant commerce clause case law thus offers support for
revitalizing Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s near-dormant “purpose
prong,” by demonstrating that identification of illegitimate legislative
purpose is a judicially manageable task. Alternatively, it allows
judges to examine the supposed factual foundations for TRAP laws
without a direct examination of their purpose.

1.

See infra Part II.
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I.

TRAP Laws and the Undue Burden Standard
A.

TRAP Laws

TRAP laws are a tool that anti-abortion advocates have
employed as part of an overarching strategy to attack the abortion
right indirectly, by burdening it with excessive regulations. This
strategy was devised as a way to undermine the right to abortion in
the absence of a Supreme Court decision to overturn Roe v. Wade.2
TRAP laws single out abortion facilities and providers for special,
onerous regulations that are often extremely costly if not impossible
to meet. States began to enact TRAP laws in the years after Roe v.
Wade.3 Because Roe v. Wade limited the kinds of restrictions that
could be imposed on pre-viability abortions, however, lower federal
courts in the early 1980s invalidated many of these regulations.4
In the 1990s, after Casey changed the standard for abortion
restrictions to allow more regulation in the pre-viability period,
TRAP laws were revived. States began taking more steps to regulate
abortion facilities, such as setting minimum size requirements for
examination, procedure, and recovery rooms.5 Challenges to these
2.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The strategy of chipping away at
the right to abortion is intended to burden access while also “chang[ing]
hearts and minds” on the issue, in the hope that the Supreme Court will
eventually be persuaded to reverse Roe. See Memorandum from James
Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Attorneys at Law, Bopp, Coleson &
Bostrom, To Whom It May Concern, at 5 (Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with
the author).

3.

GUTTMACHER INST.,
OF
ABORTION

4.

See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 426-433 (1983) (holding an Akron, Ohio, ordinance unconstitutional
that, among other things, required all abortions after the first trimester
to be performed in a hospital), overruled on other grounds by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Ragsdale v.
Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1374 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding room size
requirements not justified by important state health interests);
Mahoning Women’s Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456, 456 (6th Cir. 1979)
(holding unconstitutional a Youngstown, Ohio, abortion ordinance
which imposed costly medical and building code regulations on clinics
performing first trimester abortions), vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S.
918 (1980); Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505
F.2d 1141, 1154 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding unconstitutional regulations
promulgated by the Chicago Board of Health setting forth who could
perform an abortion, where it could be performed, and establishing
physical plant requirements).

5.

See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 703,
716-18 (D.S.C. 1999) (enjoining regulations, including minimum size
requirements of recovery and procedure rooms and specific requirements

STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: TARGETED REGULATIONS
PROVIDERS
(June
1,
2015),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf.
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laws were often unsuccessful in the Casey’s wake. For example, the
Fourth Circuit upheld strict TRAP requirements including regulations
governing the minimum width of procedure and recovery rooms.6 The
court was unconcerned about the discriminatory nature of these
regulations, declaring that “abortion clinics may rationally be
regulated as a class while other clinics or medical practices are not.”7
TRAP laws have gained momentum since 2010.8 As these laws
have proliferated and many clinics have closed, courts have been
divided on whether particularly onerous TRAP laws impose an undue
burden.9 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on these laws, but it
has heard oral arguments on a Texas TRAP law, 10 and the Court
temporarily blocked a Louisiana TRAP law.11

for janitors’ closets), reversed, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000); ProChoice Mississippi v. Thompson, No. 3:96-cv-00596-WHB, at *26-28
(S.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1996) (preliminarily enjoining detailed and onerous
physical plant requirements).
6.

See Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 159; see also Women’s Med.
Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 604-06 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that
hospital transfer agreement requirement leading to a clinic’s closure did
not constitute an undue burden). But see Tucson Woman’s Clinic v.
Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 555 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down admitting
privileges requirement).

7.

Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 159.

8.

GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 3, at 1; Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers: Avoiding the “TRAP,” CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
(Aug.
2003),
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/default/
files/documents/pub_bp_avoidingthetrap.pdf.

9.

Compare Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798
(7th Cir. 2013) (affirming preliminary injunction of Wisconsin admitting
privileges law), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); Jackson Women’s
Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming
preliminary injunction of Mississippi admitting privileges requirement);
and Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1381
(M.D. Ala. 2014) (permanently enjoining Alabama admitting privileges
law) with Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v.
Abbott, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding Texas admitting
privileges requirement and medication abortion restrictions); Whole
Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding Texas
ambulatory surgical center requirement), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499
(2015).

10.

See Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015)
(rejecting facial challenge to Texas ambulatory surgical center
requirements), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 499 (2015).

11.

June Med. Serv. v. Gee No. 15A880, 2016 WL853548 (U.S. Mar. 4,
2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/15A880-June-Medical-Serv.-v.-Gee-Order.pdf

44

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Borrowing From Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in Analyzing
Abortion Clinic Regulations

TRAP laws attack Roe indirectly but with potentially devastating
effects. Many TRAP laws impose unnecessary and expensive physical
plant requirements on abortion facilities, for example requiring they
meet the building standards of ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs).
A Mississippi ASC law enjoined in part in 1996, for example, required
that facilities providing more than ten abortions per month have sixfoot wide corridors; doors measuring forty-four inches; five separate
bathrooms; and separate locker rooms for male and female nurses,
including a bathroom in each locker room, among other
requirements.12 A similar and more recent TRAP law in Texas
requires that all facilities offering abortions meet ASC requirements,
even if they provide abortions only through medication rather than
Other variations of TRAP laws target the medical
surgery.13
professionals who perform abortions, for example requiring that they
obtain admitting privileges at nearby hospitals.14
ASC and admitting privileges requirements have been extremely
effective at shutting down clinics. Dozens of clinics across Texas
closed after that state implemented both restrictions.15 Texas’s ASC
standards, which are typical, “prescribe electrical, heating,
ventilation, air conditioning, plumbing, and other physical plant
requirements as well as staffing mandates, space utilization, minimum
square footage, and parking design.”16 ASC requirements, which are
not designed for procedures as safe as abortion, are prohibitively
costly for many clinics to implement.17 These requirements apply to
clinics that do not even perform surgeries but rather only offer

12.

Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Thompson, No. 3:96-cv-00596-WHB, slip op.
at 18-19 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1996) (preliminarily enjoining multiple
TRAP provisions including ASC requirements).

13.

See Whole Women’s Health, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (ruling Texas
ASC law constitutional except as applied to one clinic) cert. granted,
136 S. Ct. 499 (2015).

14.

See Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, 748 F.3d at 595 (upholding Texas
admitting privileges law).

15.

Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds Texas Limits on
Abortions,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(June
9,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/us/court-upholds-texas-lawcriticized-as-blocking-access-to-abortions.html?_r=0.

16.

See Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681(W.D.
Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whole
Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted 136
S. Ct. 499 (2015).

17.

See, e.g., id. at 682 (“If a clinic is able to make renovations to comply,
those costs will undisputedly approach 1 million dollars and will most
likely exceed 1.5 million dollars.”).
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abortions induced through medication.18
Some clinics cannot
implement the changes at all because the physical sites on which their
buildings are located cannot accommodate the requirements.19
Admitting privileges requirements can be equally effective in
closing clinics. These laws require that abortion providers obtain
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital, generally within a
prescribed distance from the clinic. These requirements may be
unrealistic or impossible for abortion providers to meet for reasons
unrelated to provider competence. For example, providers often fail
to meet the requirements for hospital privileges because their patients
so rarely end up in the emergency room.20 Some hospitals impose a
proximity condition for admitting privileges (requiring that the
provider live or work within a specific radius surrounding the
hospital) that providers may not meet.21 Hospitals may refuse to
extend privileges to abortion providers for political reasons.22
Admitting privileges requirements are medically unnecessary
because, as the Seventh Circuit has pointed out, “Of course any
doctor (in fact any person) can bring a patient to an emergency room
to be treated by the doctors employed there (these days called
‘hospitalists’), and . . . [a] hospital that has an emergency room is
obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even
if the patient is uninsured.”23 Indeed, in most states admitting
privileges are not required for any other procedures performed outside
of a hospital, including surgeries riskier or more complex than
abortions.24
18.

Id.

19.

See id. (noting that the cost of buying land and constructing a new
compliant clinic would likely cost more than $3 million).

20.

See Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 797 (7th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); see also Planned
Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1343 (M.D. Ala.
2014) (noting that “many hospitals require that a doctor with activestaff or courtesy-staff privileges admit a certain number of patients or
perform a certain number of procedures on a regular basis”).

21.

Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1381
(striking down Alabama’s law).

22.

See Pro-Choice Mississippi at *21 (invoking this rationale in enjoining
requirement of written transfer agreement with hospital).

23.

Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 787-88; see also Planned Parenthood of Greater
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899-900
(W.D. Tex. 2013) (“A lack of admitting privileges on the part of an
abortion provider is of no consequence when a patient presents at a
hospital emergency room. By law, no hospital can refuse to provide
emergency care.”), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).

24.

See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 789.
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B.

The Undue Burden Standard and TRAP Laws: An Awkward Fit

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,25 the Supreme Court upheld
what it referred to as the “essential holding” of Roe v. Wade,26 but it
established a new standard for evaluating abortion restrictions
applicable in the pre-viability period. The Roe v. Wade framework
had not permitted any pre-viability restrictions that furthered the
state’s interest in potential life.27 The Casey joint opinion concluded
that this aspect of the Roe framework “undervalued” the state’s
interest in embryonic or fetal life.28 The joint opinion held that the
state could enact pre-viability restrictions to promote its interest in
potential life, so long as these restrictions did not impose an undue
burden. The Court defined an undue burden as a law that has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
women seeking abortions.29
Although states did enact some TRAP laws in the post-Roe
period, as discussed above, these laws were routinely struck down
under Roe.30 The Justices did not have occasion to revisit these
rulings in Casey, since the major provisions challenged in that case
were not TRAP laws. Other than reporting requirements, which the
Court found not burdensome, the restrictions addressed in Casey all
supported either the state’s or private parties’ interest in potential
life.31 Pennsylvania’s waiting period and state-mandated information
provision allowed the state to express its preference for childbirth.
The husband notice and parental consent provisions effectively
allowed private parties to intervene in a woman’s abortion decision if
they disagreed with it.
It is therefore not surprising that, in Casey, the Court’s discussion
about the constitutionality of abortion restrictions was closely
intertwined with its discussion about how Roe v. Wade had
misapprehended the nature of the woman’s interest in an abortion
(construing it as too absolute), thus undermining the state’s interest
in the embryo or fetus. The Justices were primarily concerned with
balancing the state’s (or private parties’) moral opposition to abortion
25.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992).

26.

Id. at 846.

27.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-134 (1973).

28.

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.

29.

Id. at 877.

30.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

31.

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (noting that reporting requirements served
women’s interest in health because “information with respect to actual
patients is a vital element of medical research”).
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with the woman’s right to decide to terminate her pregnancy.
Although the Justices contemplated the possibility of state interests
beyond the interest in potential life, specifically the state’s interest in
the woman’s health, they were clearly focused on reasons why the
state would want to regulate abortion, not simply as any medical
procedure, but as a decision with moral implications the state might
find objectionable.32 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Planned
Parenthood v. Humble, because of this, “[Casey’s] application of the
‘undue burden’ standard is often not extendable in obvious ways to
the context of a law purporting to promote maternal health.”33
The Casey joint opinion articulated the undue burden standard as
follows:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free
choice, not hinder it. . . . whether a law designed to further the
State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on
the woman’s decision before fetal viability could be
constitutional. The answer is no.34

The Court then added, almost as an afterthought, “Regulations
designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid
if they do not constitute an undue burden.”35 When it restated the
new undue burden framework, the Justices noted: “As with any
medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the
health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on
the right.”36 The Court seemed generally to assume states’ good faith
in regulating abortion as it would other medical procedures and
appeared confident in courts’ ability to identify regulations not so
intended.

32.

Planned Parenthood of Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 912 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“The analysis in both Casey and Gonzales focused on state
laws purporting to advance the state’s interest in fetal life”).

33.

Id. (citation omitted).

34.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-77 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

35.

Id. at 878.

36.

Casey at 879 (emphases added).
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Thus, the Casey compromise was mainly about letting the state
express its objection to abortion without interfering with the woman’s
decision. TRAP laws, on the other hand, are defended as health
regulations, not as laws intended to advance the state’s interest in
potential life. Indeed, although government officials have not always
been disciplined about sticking to the women’s-health script,37 the
laws’ constitutionality depends on the state eschewing any purposes
related to embryonic or fetal welfare. TRAP laws do not address the
moral aspects of the abortion decision in any way.38 The only way
they could advance the state’s interest in the embryo or fetus would
be by shutting down clinics. To admit to this goal, however, would
be to acknowledge an impermissible purpose to impose a substantial
obstacle to abortion access.
C. Probing TRAP Laws’ Justifications

TRAP laws purport to regulate for women’s health, not potential
life, but this reason is clearly pretextual. The laws single out abortion
for different and more stringent treatment than comparable or even
more dangerous procedures. For example, ASC standards are not
imposed on facilities performing outpatient surgeries that carry risks
This singling out of abortion is
far higher than abortion.39
incongruous in light of the fact that abortion is an exceptionally safe
medical procedure, with only 0.3% of patients in the United States
experiencing a major complication.40
The national advocacy groups promoting TRAP laws admit to
the pretext. American United for Life (AUL), for example, is an
organization whose mission is to end legal abortion.41 AUL publishes
37.

See infra text accompanying notes 50-52.

38.

The Supreme Court strained to find such a connection when it upheld
the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, by claiming that the
targeted procedure was especially morally repugnant. Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 155-62 (2007). Even that attenuated moral tie
cannot be asserted of TRAP laws.

39.

See Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 790 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citing higher risks of colonoscopy), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2841 (2014).

40.

Susan A. Cohen, New Data on Abortion Incidence, Safety Illuminate
Key Aspects of Worldwide Abortion Debate, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV.
2, 4 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at
797 (“Complications of abortion are estimated to occur in only one out
of 111 physician-performed aspiration abortions (the most common type
of surgical abortion); and 96 percent of complications are “minor.”
(citations omitted)).

41.

About, AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/about-aul/
(describing AUL’s mission as “[a]chieving comprehensive legal protection
for human life from conception to natural death”).
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a legislative playbook of detailed strategic advice and model
legislation for state legislators. The playbook advocates laws like
TRAP measures because “state abortion-related laws designed to
protect women’s health” are more likely to withstand court
challenges.42 At the same time, AUL acknowledges that these laws
also serve the interest of protecting “unborn children’s lives.”43
However, as discussed above,44 a TRAP law cannot simultaneously
serve both of these interests. The laws “protect life” not by making
abortion safer for women but by making it harder and more expensive
to obtain or, at their most successful, by making it unavailable to
some women. TRAP laws thus exemplify the favored approach of
mainstream anti-abortion advocacy groups like the National Right to
Life Committee and AUL. These groups seek to dismantle the right
to abortion incrementally by whittling away at abortion access, a
strategy they see as more viable in the current political climate than
seeking an outright ban.45
AUL, for example, calls the incremental approach an “all-orsomething” approach and contrasts it with the “all-or-nothing”
approach abortion rights opponents in Canada have pursued. “The
Canadian all-or-nothing approach failed. The American all-orsomething approach has established legislative fences against abortion
that have actually limited and reduced abortion . . . .”46 AUL’s
playbook explains how restrictions like TRAP laws were not
permissible under Roe’s original framework,47 but now offer a way to
undermine Roe indirectly. “[T]hese [incremental] laws—such as . . .
abortion clinic regulations—save lives now. When a direct assault is
not feasible because of obstacles beyond our control, it is necessary to
design and implement a larger and broader assault on the target and
its foundation.”48 AUL openly touts its strategy of cumulatively
imposing burdens, describing as a prime example how this strategy
succeeded in reducing abortion access in Mississippi to a single clinic.49
42.

DENISE M. BURKE, ET AL., AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING
LIFE 2013 17 (2013) (“[I]n light of Casey and Gonzales, laws that
include a stated women’s health justification are more likely to
withstand judicial scrutiny.”).

43.

Id.

44.

See supra text accompanying notes 37-38

45.

See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment
of Truth for the Anti-Abortion-Rights Movement?, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 245, 260-61 (2013).

46.

BURKE, supra note 42, at 39.

47.

Id. at 38.

48.

Id. at 41.

49.

Id. at 55- 56.
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State officials exulting in the passage of TRAP laws have praised
the measures both for protecting embryonic life and safeguarding
women’s health. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton described the
Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding his state’s ASC law a “victory for
life and women’s health.”50 After Texas passed its ASC requirement,
Texas Lt. Gov. David Dewhurst gleefully tweeted a map predicting
how many clinics would shut down and stating that the law would
After signing Mississippi’s
essentially ban abortion statewide.51
admitting privileges law, which would have closed the state’s last
remaining abortion clinic, Gov. Phil Bryant declared, “We are going
to continue to try to work to end abortion in Mississippi and this is
an historic day to begin that process.”52
Obvious as it may be that TRAP laws are intended to burden
access to abortion rather than promote women’s health, the question
remains how to prove this in court under the undue burden standard.
There are two possible ways to expose the pretextual health and
safety rationale behind TRAP laws.
The first is by directly
examining a TRAP law’s purpose. The second is by making the state
justify a TRAP law with attention to whether the state has employed
the least discriminatory means of regulating abortion. If a state
treats abortion differently (and more burdensomely) than comparable
medical procedures but cannot justify the differential treatment on
medical grounds, it is likely that the purpose is a pretext for the
state’s ideological opposition to abortion. Dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence can help with each of these approaches.
1.

Attacking Purpose Directly

The undue burden standard holds that an abortion restriction is
unconstitutional if its purpose or effect is to impose a substantial
obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions.53 Thus, one way to
attack the invalidity of TRAP law is to attack its purpose directly by
proving that the women’s health rationale is a pretext, and that the
real purpose is to reduce access to abortion. The “purpose prong” of
50.

Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 15.

51.

See Christy Hoppe, Lt. Gov. Dewhurst Says in Tweet That Abortion
Bill All About Shutting Down Accessibility, THE DALLAS MORNING
NEWS
(June
13,
2013),
http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2013/06/lt-gov-dewhurst-says-intweet-that-abortion-bill-all-about-shutting-down-accessibility.html/.

52.

Jeffrey Hess, Governor Bryant Signs New Regulations For Mississippi’s
Only Abortion Clinic, MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC BROADCASTING (April 12,
2012),
http://archive.mpbonline.org/News/article/
governor_bryant_signs_new_regulations_for_mississippis_only_abort
ion_clinic#sthash.ri8xGoJd.dpuf.

53.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-77 (1992).
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the Casey standard, however, has generally not been an effective
In Mazurek v.
vehicle for challenging abortion restrictions.54
Armstrong,55 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a law
prohibiting medical providers other than physicians from performing
abortions. In this per curiam decision, the Court refused to find an
improper purpose despite evidence that an anti-abortion-rights group
had drafted the law, and even though there was no evidence to
support the state’s women’s-safety rationale.
In contrast to its reluctance to find improper purposes, the Court
has readily found valid state purposes for abortion restrictions based
on flimsy factual foundations.56 In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court
held that the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act had a valid
purpose, stating that Congress needed only a “rational basis to act.” 57
The Court located this “rational basis” in part in the theory that
women might come to regret their abortions, even as it admitted that
the theory lacked scientific support.58
Some scholars have argued for a reinvigoration of the purpose
prong.59 Lower courts also seem increasingly interested in probing the
rationales states put forward for TRAP laws and have scrutinized
whether the stated reasons hold up factually. While the courts have
generally not formally applied Casey’s purpose prong, or have even
expressly disavowed doing so,60 their examination of the states’
justifications reflect a new focus on states’ purposes in regulating
abortion. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Strange, United
States District Judge Myron Thompson extensively examined
Alabama’s arguments that its admitting privileges requirement was

54.

See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, In Abortion Litigation, It’s the Facts
that Matter, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 149, 150 (2013); Jenny Jarrard, Note,
The Failed Purpose Prong: Women’s Right To Choose In Theory, Not
In Fact, Under The Undue Burden Standard, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 469 (2014).

55.

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997).

56.

Borgmann, supra note 54, at 149.

57.

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).

58.

Id. at 159.

59.

See, e.g, Priscilla Smith, If the Purpose Fits: The Two Functions of
Casey’s Purpose Inquiry, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1135, 1169-71 (2014);
Note, After Ayotte: The Need To Defend Abortion Rights With
Renewed “Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552 (2006).

60.

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330,
1341 n.7 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (“Since the court finds that the statute would
have the effect of imposing a substantial obstacle, it is unnecessary to
reach the purpose claim . . .”).
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needed to protect women’s health.61 Thompson concluded that
Alabama’s justifications for the law were “weak, at best.”62
In reviewing a preliminary injunction of Wisconsin’s admitting
privileges law, Judge Richard Posner, writing for a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, skeptically
reviewed the state’s women’s safety rationale, noting that “[i]n this
case the medical grounds thus far presented . . . are feeble.”63
Similarly, in a recent decision blocking Texas’s ASC requirements and
enjoining its admitting-privileges law as to two specific clinics, United
States District Judge Lee Yeakel found the state’s health rationales
“largely unfounded,” “without a reliable basis,” “weak,” “speculative,”
and “not credible.”64
Dormant commerce clause analysis includes a purpose inquiry
that evaluates whether facially neutral laws nevertheless have the
“purpose or effect” of discriminating against interstate commerce.65
This framework can help courts evaluate whether a TRAP law was
passed in order to burden access to abortion rather than for the
stated reason of protecting women’s health.
2.

Attacking Purpose Indirectly

A second way to expose an unconstitutional purpose behind an
abortion restriction is to make the state justify the law. This
approach smokes out illegitimate purposes indirectly.66 As shown
above, several recent federal court decisions that have examined the
factual foundations supposedly necessitating TRAP laws have
recognized how “feeble” those footings are.67 In these cases, judges
have typically applied a balancing test for examining legislative
purpose. They first assess the extent of the burden an abortion
restriction imposes. Where the burden is severe, they have required a
commensurate burden of justification by the state.
61.

See id.

62.

Id. at 1342.

63.

Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798
(7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014).

64.

Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684-85 (W.D.
Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, Whole Woman’s
Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
499 (2015). The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected Judge Yeakel’s
reasoning. 790 F.3d at 585 (stating that plaintiffs “failed to proffer
competent evidence contradicting the legislature’s statement of a
legitimate purpose for H.B. 2”).

65.

See infra Part II.B.

66.

Borgmann, supra note 54, at 150; Smith, supra note 59, at 1137.

67.

Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798.
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For example, when Judge Thompson struck down Alabama’s
admitting-privileges law in Planned Parenthood v. Strange,68 he
weighed the burdens the law imposed against the strength of
Alabama’s interest in the law. Judge Thompson concluded that
Alabama’s law imposed “significant harms” on women,69 and, as noted
above, he found the state’s justifications for the law “weak, at best.”70
Judge Richard Posner likewise explained, in examining Wisconsin’s
admitting-privileges law: “The feebler the [state’s] medical grounds,
the likelier the burden, even if slight, to be ‘undue’ in the sense of
disproportionate or gratuitous.”71 Judge Yeakel, in reviewing Texas’s
ASC law, balanced the predicted drastic reduction in abortion clinics
against the state’s safety rationales, which he found flimsy.72 In
reviewing Arizona restrictions on medication abortions, the Ninth
Circuit explained that “we compare the extent of the burden a law
imposes on a woman’s right to abortion with the strength of the
state’s justification for the law.”73
Dormant commerce clause case law can help courts willing to
probe states’ justifications for TRAP laws. Abortion facility and
provider regulations are usually discriminatory on their face.74 As
such, the more appropriate analog in the dormant commerce clause
analysis might in fact not be the purpose analysis but the strict test
courts apply to discriminatory laws.75 This test requires a heavy
burden of justification on the part of the state.76
3.

Why a New Approach Is Needed

The Casey undue burden standard is primarily focused on laws
that openly advance the state’s interest in potential life.77 As such, it
is not well-suited to analyzing TRAP laws that purport to promote
maternal health, while serving an underlying goal of hindering access

68.

Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1342
(M.D. Ala. 2014).

69.

Id. at 1355.

70.

Id. at 1342.

71.

Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798.

72.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

73.

Planned Parenthood of Ariz. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir.
2014).

74.

See infra Part II.C.

75.

See infra Part II.A.

76.

Id.

77.

See supra Part I.B.
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to abortion.78
Some federal courts have adapted the Casey
framework to employ a balancing test in examining a women’s health
rationale for abortion restrictions.79 However, this approach has some
disadvantages. In particular, as discussed above, recent approaches
have linked the state’s burden of justification for its law to the extent
of the burden the law places on women. This link requires that much
of the litigation in a TRAP law challenge be focused on the extent to
which a law has the effect of imposing an undue burden.
Focusing on effects is potentially problematic for two reasons.
First, the approach fails to make purpose a truly distinct prong,
despite Casey’s clear designation of the two prongs as separate.
Second, many TRAP laws are challenged on a pre-enforcement basis.
Pre-enforcement challenges are critical because TRAP laws have the
potential to force clinics to close, results that could be irrevocable
even if the litigation is ultimately successful. Following Texas’s
enactment of admitting privileges and ASC requirements, twenty-two
of forty-one clinics across the state closed.80 When a law is challenged
before it is enforced, however, it can be very difficult to prove to a
court’s satisfaction that the law will have the predicted effects. When
the Fifth Circuit initially granted a stay of the district court’s
preliminary injunction of Texas’s admitting privileges law,81 allowing
the law to go into effect pending the litigation, the plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court for emergency relief. The Court refused to
intervene, 82 and a rash of clinic closed.83
Dormant commerce clause case law can help avoid these problems
by suggesting approaches either for directly examining a TRAP law’s
78.

See id.

79.

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen 738 F. 3d
786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); Planned
Parenthood v. Humble, 753 F.3d at 912; Planned Parenthood Se., Inc.
v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1336-37 (M.D. Ala. 2014); Planned
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 898 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th
Cir. 2014); see also supra Part I.C.2.

80.

Lawrence Hurley, Impact of Texas Clinic Law at Issue in Abortion Case
(Mar.
1,
2016),
Before
Supreme
Court,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-court-abortion-idUSKCN0W35H5.

81.

Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013).

82.

Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
134 S. Ct. 506, 507 (2013).

83.

Irin Carmon, What You Need to Know About the Texas Abortion Case,
MSNBC (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/what-youneed-know-about-the-texas-abortion-case-scotus.
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purpose, or for requiring the state to justify a law that discriminates
against abortion, without linking that analysis to a demonstration of
unduly burdensome effects.

II.
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
TRAP LAWS
A.

Overview of Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis

The commerce clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.84 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this clause to have a “negative” or “dormant”
aspect that protects Congress’s power by prohibiting states or
localities from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate
commerce, in the absence of congressional approval.85 The evil the
dormant commerce clause intends to prevent is economic
protectionism by individual states.86 For this reason, dormant
commerce clause doctrine is especially wary of state and local laws
that discriminate against interstate commerce.
Such laws are
presumptively invalid regardless of the burdens they impose.87
A law may discriminate against interstate commerce in one of
three ways. It may discriminate on its face,88 or it may be facially
neutral but have either a discriminatory purpose89 or a discriminatory
effect.90 If it discriminates in any of these ways, dormant commerce
clause analysis applies a strict test for evaluating the law, known as
“virtually per se invalidity.”91 Under this test, the burden is on the
state to show that the law was motivated by a purpose other than
economic protectionism.
While states are permitted to discriminate against interstate
commerce if they act for reasons other than economic protectionism,
84.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power “to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes.”).

85.

South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 592 (8th
Cir. 2003).

86.

Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1996); see HP Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-33, 537-38 (1949).

87.

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).

88.

Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992).

89.

Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).

90.

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 n. 19 (1986).

91.

City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
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this framework–placing the burden on the state to justify a
discriminatory law–makes sense because historically economic
protectionism has been a primary motivation for such discriminatory
laws.92 Furthermore, courts need to insure against the particular,
corrosive harms that laws motivated by economic protectionism can
cause.93
Even assuming the state meets its burden of showing that the law
was passed for a purpose other than economic protection, the court’s
inquiry is not finished. The court next asks whether there are less
discriminatory means to accomplish the same purpose.94 The tailoring
analysis under this part of the dormant commerce clause framework is
akin to strict scrutiny, so states may easily fail this “means”
analysis.95
B.

Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause Framework to Discern an
Unconstitutional Purpose for TRAP Laws

Dormant commerce clause doctrine resembles the undue burden
standard for abortion in that, if a state law is passed with the purpose
of discriminating against interstate commerce, a court will invalidate
it without proceeding to examine the burdens the law imposes on
interstate commerce. Thus, like the undue burden standard, dormant
commerce clause doctrine includes an independent “purpose” clause.
Recent federal court decisions have applied a purpose analysis
under the dormant commerce clause to determine whether a law that
is neutral on its face intentionally discriminates against interstate
commerce.96 This test resembles the test applied under the equal
protection clause to determine whether a facially neutral law was
motivated by discriminatory intent. Like in equal protection case
law, courts apply a list of factors to help identify a purpose to
discriminate. These factors include statements by lawmakers; the
sequence of events leading up to statute’s adoption, including
92.

See id. at 623-34; H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 534-38.

93.

H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 538-39.

94.

See generally Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (when
discrimination against commerce is demonstrated, the burden falls on
the state to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the
statute and the unavailability of non-discriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve local interests).

95.

See, e.g., id. at 338 (invalidating law and noting that the state chose
“the most discriminatory means even though nondiscriminatory
alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State’s purported legitimate
local purpose more effectively”).

96.

Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004);
Waste Mgt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001);
Jones v. Gale, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075 (D. Neb. 2005).
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irregularities in procedures used to adopt the law; a state’s consistent
pattern of “disparately impacting members of a particular class of
persons”; a statute’s historical background, including any history of
discrimination by the state; and a statute’s use of highly ineffective
means to promote the legitimate interests asserted by the state.97
Several courts have found a discriminatory purpose under the
dormant commerce clause by applying this test. For example, in
South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, a provision of the
South Dakota Constitution generally prohibited corporations from
acquiring or obtaining an interest in land used for farming and from
otherwise engaging in farming in South Dakota. 98 The Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the provision was motivated by a
purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce, based on direct
evidence including the “pro” statement on a “pro-con” statement
compiled by Secretary of State Hazeltine and disseminated to South
Dakota voters, and notes from drafting meetings.99 The court also
found indirect evidence of discriminatory purpose from “irregularities
in the drafting process,” including the legislators’ failure to make an
effort to find information that a ban on corporate farming would
effectively preserve family farms or protect the environment (the
purported non-protectionist reasons proffered for the amendment).100
Significantly, the court in Hazeltine was willing to find an
unconstitutional purpose to discriminate even though the provision
was a constitutional amendment, approved by “thousands of citizens
of South Dakota who voted for [the] Amendment.”101
In Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a discriminatory purpose had
prompted Virginia statutory provisions that placed a cap on the
amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) that could be accepted by
Virginia landfills and that restricted the use of barges and trucks to
transport such waste in Virginia.102 In considering plaintiffs’ summary
judgment motion, the court concluded, “[N]o reasonable juror could
find that the statutory provisions at issue had a purpose other than to
reduce the flow of MSW generated outside Virginia into Virginia for
disposal.”103 The court based this conclusion upon the historical
97.

Waste Mgt. Holdings, 252 F. 3d at 336.

98.

South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 597 (8th
Cir. 2003).

99.

Id. at 593-94.

100. Id. at 594-95.
101. Id. at 596.
102. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 252 F.3d at 336.
103. Id. at 340.
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background and sequence of events leading to the enactment and
signing of the statutory provisions.104 The sequence of events began
with news reports that New York City planned to close its Fresh Kills
landfill and begin exporting more of its MSW, followed by reports of a
$20,000,000 investment by defendants in a Virginia landfill. These
news reports launched a political movement by a state senator and
the governor to curb the flow of out-of-state MSW from entering
Virginia.105 The movement was evidenced by press releases and
statements from the senator and Gov. Jim Gilmore, a letter from the
governor to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and the
legislative transcript, which established “the General Assembly’s
general antipathy toward MSW generated outside Virginia.”106
In Superior FCR Landfill, Inc. v. Wright County, a federal
district court found that a jury had sufficient evidence to find that a
county in Minnesota intentionally discriminated against interstate
commerce when it enacted zoning regulations preventing the
plaintiff’s expansion of its landfill.107 The direct evidence supporting
an improper purpose included a commissioner’s campaign statements
strongly opposing the importation of out-of-state waste and other
commissioners’ awareness of and concern about the landfill
Indirect evidence
expansion’s effect on interstate commerce.108
included a commissioner’s statements discussing the small amount of
waste being produced locally; a proposal for increased waste
surcharges in part to slow the amount of out-of-county waste coming
into the landfill; procedural irregularities in the consideration of
plaintiff’s expansion request; and a history of discrimination against
interstate commerce; among other factors.109
Decisions like these should reassure courts that, although they
have been reluctant to apply the independent purpose prong under
Casey, identifying unconstitutional legislative purpose is not
impossible. That is particularly true in both the dormant commerce
clause and abortion contexts. Economic protectionist purposes can be
popular among some constituents and therefore are often openly
expressed by state legislators and officials. In Waste Management
104. Id. at 336.
105. Id. at 336-40.
106. Id. at 339.
107. Superior FCR Landfill, Inc. v. Wright County, 2002 WL 511460 (D.
Minn. Mar. 31, 2002) (the court also found that jury had evidence to
find that the county failed to show that it lacked other, less
discriminatory alternatives).
108. Id. at *9-10.
109. Id. at *3.
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Holdings, the Fourth Circuit cited public statements opposing out-ofstate waste made by the governor, state legislators, and other state
officials.110 The governor, for example, had declared that “the home
state of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison has no intention o[f]
becoming New York’s dumping grounds.”111
Likewise, legislators and public officials are often likely to admit
to a desire to end abortion in order to score political points. Even
when they are purportedly passing, signing, or enforcing legislation in
order to protect women’s health, legislators and public officials have a
hard time policing themselves and remaining silent about their true
goal of impeding abortion access.112 In this way, both the dormant
commerce clause and abortion contexts are unlike contexts such as
racial discrimination, where it has become rare to see legislators or
officials frankly expressing discriminatory motivations. Thus, the
unconstitutional purposes underlying TRAP laws may be easier to
identify, and the dormant commerce clause framework provides a
ready means for doing so.
C.

Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause Framework to Require a
Justification for Discriminatory TRAP Laws

Dormant commerce clause analysis can also be helpful to courts
willing to require states to justify discriminatory regulation of
abortion providers and facilities. The strict test that dormant
commerce clause doctrine applies to laws that discriminate against
interstate commerce is analogous to what courts should do when laws
discriminate against abortion facilities or providers. When laws
discriminate in this manner, there is actually no need to evaluate
purpose. Courts use the purpose prong of the dormant clause analysis
when attempting to discern whether a law that is facially neutral
towards interstate commerce was nevertheless enacted with a
discriminatory purpose.113 When a law expressly discriminates against
interstate commerce, the court does not need to examine purpose.114
Rather, the court goes on to determine whether the state can offer
any non-protectionist reason for the discriminatory treatment and, if
so, whether there are any less discriminatory means of accomplishing
such purposes.115 Note that this is an indirect way of smoking out an
illegitimate purpose. Courts do not require that plaintiffs prove that
110. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 252 F.3d at 337.
111. Id. at 337.
112. See Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 15.
113. See supra note 96.
114. See Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992).
115. See id. at 342-46.
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economic protectionism is the purpose. Rather, courts look to
whether state’s purported non-protectionist purpose holds up to
scrutiny.116
The same should hold true for laws that treat abortion differently
than comparable medical procedures, without claiming potential life
as a justification. The reason that the courts apply a strict test to
laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce is that
such laws are highly likely to be motivated by the very evil the
dormant commerce clause aims to prevent: economic protectionism.117
The long history of discrimination against interstate commerce for
protectionist purpose warrants the strict evaluation of facially
discriminatory laws. Similarly, the evil that the undue burden
standard aims to prevent is states enacting pre-viability restrictions
with the intent to burden women’s access to abortion.118 TRAP laws
virtually always discriminate against abortion providers or facilities
on their face. The entire purpose of these laws is to treat abortion in
a uniquely burdensome manner. As Priscilla Smith points out:
The danger that arises in the abortion context is different from
the danger that arises in the context of a law neutral on its face
but enacted with discriminatory motive. We are not confronted
with neutral laws of general applicability that may impact a
certain racial or religious group disproportionately. We are most
often confronted with laws that squarely subject abortion
services, and thus women who seek them, to unique burdens.119

It is not self-evident from the reasoning in Casey that laws
purporting to promote women’s health and safety should be permitted
to treat abortion differently than similar procedures120 or those of
comparable medical risk,121 absent a medical justification for the
disparity. Casey clearly contemplated that laws aiming to promote
the state’s interest in potential life – that is, laws that regulate
abortion as a moral decision – should be permitted to single out
abortion for special treatment.122 Thus, for example, Casey approved
a law designed to let women know of the state’s preference for

116. See id.
117. See supra notes 92-93.
118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); see
supra Part I.B.
119. Smith, supra note 61, at 1166.
120. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
122. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
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childbirth.123 The interest in potential life does not exist with respect
to most other medical procedures. Thus, recognizing the state’s
interest in potential life is to recognize its power to treat abortion
differently than other medical procedures when acting to further that
interest.
But courts, including the Supreme Court, have not adequately
addressed whether or when discrimination against abortion is
permissible when the state’s justification is medical. Indeed, they
generally have not incorporated the fact of such discrimination into
the legal framework at all. It is true that differential treatment of
other medical procedures does not normally trigger closer
constitutional scrutiny. But, as in the dormant commerce clause
context, courts have reason to be skeptical when states decide to treat
abortion differently, because of the long history of advocates’ and
elected officials’ resistance to Roe and their attempts to dismantle it
incrementally.
As TRAP laws have threatened abortion access in increasingly
obvious ways, judges have seemed to recognize the need to require
some justification for special regulation of abortion on health grounds.
For example, a federal district judge in Alabama reviewing that
state’s admitting privileges law noted,
Of course, outside the context of an undue-burden challenge, a
regulatory decision grounded only in . . . speculation would be
an acceptable exercise of the State’s police powers. However,
whether, under Casey, the justification is strong enough to
warrant the burdens and obstacles that the staff-privileges
requirement would create for Alabama women seeking abortions
is another question entirely.124

Even as early as 1996, a federal district court in Mississippi found
that the state could not meet its burden of “showing that there is a
reasonable medical necessity to preserve the woman’s health” in
requiring ob-gyn residency training for all physicians performing
abortions; for imposing the building requirements of ambulatory
surgical centers on abortion facilities that operated very differently
than such centers; and for requiring a written hospital transfer
agreement with a nearby hospital.125
More intriguingly, Judge Posner’s recent opinion for the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Planned Parenthood v. Hollen seemed to
123. Id. at 883.
124. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1376
(M.D. Ala. 2014) (citation omitted).
125. Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Thompson, No. 3:96CV596BN, slip op. at *1821 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1996).

62

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Borrowing From Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in Analyzing
Abortion Clinic Regulations

recognize that differential treatment of abortion is suspect.126
Without pursuing the line of inquiry, the court noted in passing that
an “issue of equal protection of the laws is lurking in this case.”127
Judge Posner noted that the “complete absence” of admitting
privileges requirements for riskier medical procedures suggested that
the admitting-privileges law’s likely purpose was to impose a
substantial obstacle to abortion.128
It makes sense to require states to justify differential treatment of
abortion when they do not purport to act in furtherance of the
interest in potential life. The Casey framework was specifically
altered to expand the state’s power to promote its interest in
embryonic or fetal life in the pre-viability period, unlike what was
This is the essence of the “Casey
permitted under Roe.129
compromise.” If the state wants to earn the increased deference of
the Casey standard, then, it should be required to admit on the
record that its law is for the protection of potential life. Otherwise, it
should forfeit this deference. States should not be able to assert an
interest in women’s health, yet still gain the stronger deference
accorded the interest in potential life.
Advocates and states enacting restrictions after Roe tended to be
more focused on expressing their interest in fetal life and in making
women hear arguments against abortion. But the anti-abortion
movement has now shifted tactics in significant part to a medical
rationale, which they believe is more likely to succeed in the courts.130
The Casey framework was never really designed for this type of law
and is ill-suited for evaluating it.
Thus, as with evaluating
discriminatory laws under the dormant commerce clause, laws that
discriminate against abortion facilities or providers under a rationale
of women’s safety rather than potential life should be evaluated under
a test similar to that applied in dormant commerce clause case law.
Courts should first ask whether the law discriminates against
abortion providers on its face.131 If it does, the court should examine
whether the law is motivated by a purpose other than to impose a
burden on women seeking abortions. The state will assert the
126. Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014).
127. Id. at 790.
128. Id.
129. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
130. See BURKE ET AL., supra note 42, at 17.
131. If the law is facially neutral, the dormant commerce clause test for
identifying a discriminatory purpose could be applied. See supra Parts
I(C)(1); II(B).
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justification of women’s health. But, as under the dormant commerce
clause – where states often assert environmental protection or other
non-economic-protectionist justifications for laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce – the court’s analysis should not end
there. Rather, the court should evaluate whether states could pursue
the same interest through less discriminatory means.
This last step is missing as an express step in virtually all TRAP
decisions, yet it is vitally important. The inquiry will be a highly
effective means of identifying whether a law was truly motivated by a
medical purpose. For example, if the state were truly concerned that
abortions performed by suction curettage required special safety
regulations, it should be equally concerned that similar procedures on
non-pregnant patients, such as dilation and curettage (D&Cs), were
regulated similarly.132 The state’s credibility in asserting a women’s
health rationale is undermined if it is unwilling to treat non-abortion
patients in a like manner.
History demonstrates that abortion-discriminatory laws are more
likely to be motivated by anti-abortion sentiment than women’s
health.133 This history is similar to the history of state laws that
discriminate against interstate commerce for economic protectionist
reasons. The dormant commerce clause framework is therefore
eminently suited for analyzing TRAP laws.

Conclusion
Anti-abortion advocates and state legislators are increasingly
turning to a women’s health rationale to justify abortion restrictions.
While the underlying goal to end abortion access remains the same,
these laws do not overtly claim to advance the state’s interest in
potential life. TRAP laws have proven to be a remarkably effective
implementation of the incrementalist strategy for eroding access to
abortion. The Casey framework, however, is primarily aimed at laws
that promote the state’s interest in potential life. Courts have
differed in how Casey applies to TRAP laws. Some courts have
closely scrutinized the rationale underlying TRAP laws, but they have
tended to tie such inquiries to examinations of the laws’ effects.
Dormant commerce clause doctrine provides a useful and
appropriate framework for analyzing TRAP Laws. The doctrine was
designed to ferret out a common but illegitimate purpose (promoting
economic protectionism) underlying laws that discriminate against
interstate commerce. The framework provides a useful model both for
132. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1336
(making this comparison).
133. See Borgmann, supra note 45.
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courts wishing to examine TRAP laws’ purposes directly and for
those who want to require states to justify discriminatory laws that
purport to regulate abortion purely on medical grounds. Either way
the framework is used, it provides a mechanism to examine the
rationales for TRAP laws independently of their effects, providing a
potentially helpful option for pre-enforcement challenges, where courts
may be reluctant to accept predictions of specific effects.
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